Introduction
Trends in globalization have caused profound changes to the way companies conduct their business, so that the ability to expand globally, especially into emerging markets, is now a core corporate skill. The track record of foreign investment in practice has, however, often been dismal.
Companies that accurately appraise their foreign alternatives will have a strategic advantage, whereas making wrong decisions can severely erode their competitiveness. This paper reviews methods of appraising FDI, with a focus on real options, via the use of a case study involving Force Corporation's failed investment in cinemas in Argentina, via Village South America, in 1996 -2005 . We use this case-study to argue that the valuation of foreign investment opportunities in emerging markets often has to be treated differently to domestic investment and is normally best structured as a series of investment options, and it is essential that a real options framework is added to the appraisal process. The case study thus serves as useful practical illustration of the use of real options in foreign investment appraisal.
Foreign Direct Investment Appraisals
Investment appraisal is quite different for international as opposed to domestic capital budgeting decisions, as foreign investments expose companies to a collection of new and complex risks that are not found in a domestic context. A foreign direct investment (FDI) appraisal in an emerging market will need to, for example, evaluate the issues around the impact of foreign exchange volatility on asset and debt value, the typically higher level of economic and financial volatility, as well as impacts from the underlying financing structure. Accurate appraisals should also combine aspects of strategy, management and finance. Lee & Kwok (1998) argue that FDIs, while increasing profit, typically lead to large increases in the variance of profits, which can impact on share price. Lee & Kwok (1998) found that FDIs had a higher level of early bankruptcy than domestic investments. Markides et al (1994) argues that because of the large potential sunk costs and variations in profits it is crucial that companies value FDIs accurately. Overpaying during an investment will ~ 3 ~ leave a company behind the break-even point before the operation even starts. It will also leave the MNC overexposed to financial and other risks in relation to profitability. These difficulties are accentuated by the aspect that for emerging market investment many of the risks are difficult to quantify at the initial valuation stage process, and there is a scarcity of accurate information. Lee and Caves (1998) also argue that often that there is a large element of learning in FDIs so that the risks and real costs of emerging market investments do not become apparent until the investment has been made. Purty (1979) and Davidson (1980) found that it is common practice for companies to incorporate this element of learning by making their initial investments in culturally similar countries first, even if profit potential is lower. After this first investment has created a higher level of accumulated experience, companies can then move on with more success to more culturally distant countries. FDI appraisals need to take account of the need for learning by using staged FDI, with re-evaluation and re-appraisal at the end of each stage.
The issues with volatility and information scarcity mean that emerging market FDI appraisals cannot, in general, be solved by using more complicated methods. In fact, in practice, Keck, Levengood & Longfield (1998) found that for emerging market FDI appraisals, financial practitioners often use using less information, rather than more, with an increase in the use of heuristics or rules of thumb.
3 VSA Case-study Background
Origin of Village South America
Force Corporation commenced operations in New Zealand in 1986, and initially it operated as a successful private property development company. In April 1997, Force went to the market to raise additional equity to help fund its future proposed Argentine expansion. NZ$17.45M was raised, to fund the development of 37 screens in multiplexes in the regional cities of Pilar, Avellaneda and Rosario during 1997/98. In the Pilar development a related retail complex was developed, which proved profitable by itself, and attracted additional cinema patronage. This became the model for subsequent developments.
Key Project Risks in 1997:
Foreign Exchange Risk: Due to past currency-related disasters the Argentine Peso was pegged to the US$ at a 1:1 ratio. Economic Indicators such as GDP, and inflation were stable, meaning that the peg was likely to hold in the short to medium term. However, there was a high foreign exchange risk associated with the peg over the long term, which would be non-linear and increase rapidly over time.
Inflation: Inflation was extremely low at 0.3%. Inflation risk is highly correlated with foreign exchange risk, so the government needed to keep inflation low in order for the peg to hold.
Conversely low inflation (below 1%) can hamper economic growth, and the medium term prospect was for economic growth to slow.
Economic Risk:
The success of Argentina's economy was largely dependent on the preservation of the peg and growth in key trading partners. Low productivity from government, corruption, and high bureaucratic spending also presented major economic risks.
Political Risks: The left-wing Peronist party traditionally represented a threat to foreign investors.
Poor economic management and corruption are recurring problems. However since the economic crisis in 1990, Peronist fiscal management and responsibility was encouraging.
Investment Phases
In 1997 subsequent investment was divided into 3 phases of investment, which when completed would make VSA the predominant cinema operator in the country, with a substantial related retail presence. Force's joint venture partners were keen to proceed through all three phases as fast as A large number of available sites had been identified for redevelopment.
Constraints Associated with Investment:
Argentina has traditionally been a volatile economic environment with high country risks.
Cultural distance may cause monitoring and agency cost problems. Corruption also represents a problem.
Force's comparatively small size meant that VSA represented a comparatively large amount of capital relative to Force's asset base. This was not the case for Village Roadshow. 4 Valuation using conventional DCF
We start by setting out the classical discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis. This starts by generating the best possible estimates of future revenue and capital investment, normally derived after discussion with marketing and engineering staff. Then a discount rate is estimated, which for many practitioners is the hardest part and is particularly complex for international investing. Political and economic risk can be approximated by using the credit spread or differences in government bond rate between respective countries as this provides a market consensus of country risk. Following
Luehrman (1998b) we assessed country risk volatility at 40%, which is a conservative minimum plausible estimate 4 . The market for multiplex cinema development was not well established in Argentina, so a discount is required to reflect market unfamiliarity. The adjustment reflects such costs as additional labor costs needed in order for employees to familiarize themselves with operations, and time required to generate managerial economies of experience. The VSA phase 1 DCF estimates are summarized in table 1, as at the end of 1996, which is regarded as 'year 0'. Note that this return is dominated by the terminal value.
2 Source: Force Corporation Annual Report (1997).
3 Standard real option theory does not always hold in oligopolistic situations because future returns do not follow a random walk. Real option analysis assumes that individual players in the market cannot affect other's actions. Game theory can be incorporated into real option analysis but this is highly complicated. 4 We wanted to make the estimate as conservative as possible because property ownership was involved. It is likely that a figure well in excess of 40% could have been justified. In 1996, Argentine market volatility was 61.63%. Eiteman et al. (2001) Page 480. The DCF model depended on estimated investment parameters which are used to estimate a risk-adjusted discount rate, and a business volatility measure. The results are summarized in the Despite forecast revenues considerably exceeding forecasted costs, using the estimated discount rate of 20.21% meant that the project value, NPV, was negative at US$ -1.12m. The negative value was not a surprise to the management as the phase 1 was not regarded as a stand-alone project, with consideration based mainly its success creating further investment opportunity. Profits were ~ 9 ~ expected to come from phase 2, whose construction was expected to start in 1999. Phase 2 cashflow projections are shown in the Table 3 . Table 2 shows an estimated phase 2 NPV of US$ 1.30m. Phases 1 and 2 thus have a combined NPV of US$ 0.18m. Note that, while the combined NPV is positive, it is still not very attractive, as the rate of return from the NPV appraisal on the total investment value of US$ 27.17m is less than 0.7%.
Calculating NPV and IRR Return to Force in NZ$ requires adjusting for foreign exchange changes taxation. The return is greater than that given in the VSA analysis because of an expected devaluation in the New Zealand dollar. This result should be given precedence over VSA's NPV as it is important to evaluate projects on the basis of net returns to the parent company.
Once we have the inputs for an NPV we can easily calculate an APV. The advantage of using APV is its greater information content. An APV breaks cash-flows down into different income streams, (i) Cash-flows derived from equity (direct cash-flows from the investment), (ii) Cash-flows derived from the financial mix. This approach makes it easy for managers to analyze the value creation derived from areas within the project. Because cash-flows derived from debt (income tax credits)
are less risky than cash-flows derived from the investment (forecast customer receipts) it is more accurate to use different discount rates for the various cash-flows. Projects which are heavily reliant on high levels of debt to become economic need to be carefully scrutinized. The major issue with the NPV appraisal is that it ignores the element of the flexibility of the second phase investment. Intuitively attractive strategic projects are often rejected by NPV methods, because NPV fails to adequately value long-term potential and the ability to respond to the changing business environment.
Because the business environment was highly volatile, (annual standard deviation is about 40%), the NPV appraisal deals with this by imposing a high discount rate. Because the majority of the return is embodied in the terminal value, the estimated return is heavily discounted. Note also that the high variation in possible profit means a point estimate like US$ 0.18m is meaningless.
In actual fact the investment returns could be substantially higher or lower than that estimated, and would not be clarified until after the two years of trial in phase 1. The project also had a lot of ~ 11 ~ flexibility. VSA's management deliberately used the two years in phase 1, 1997-98, to learn more about market and economic conditions and competitor strategy. The investment involved in second phase would only be implemented if phase 1 was successful and business conditions were favorable. Alternatively, VSA could elect to expand in different localities, increase developments, or even delay future investment should market conditions not warrant further expansion. The possible substantial future profits from phase 3 are also ignored. APV and NPV methods do not take into account this flexibility, and treat investment in Phase 2 as if it were mandatory. FDI appraisal needs to explicitly recognize the flexibility involved in a phased investment strategy, with progression to a subsequent stage only if the present stage is successful needs to be explicitly recognized. Phase 1 investment should thus not be seen as a stand-alone project, but valued as expanding the investor's future possible opportunities. This is best captured as real option methodology, which views future investments more realistically as opportunities under uncertainty. The recognition of this option will potentially add some positive value to the project. The call option could also be calculated with binary model, which is based upon the following parameters as follows: We have used the standard deviation of the underlying asset value to estimate the up (e σ ) and down (e -σ ) movement levels (the standard deviation of the binary model is 0.402; which is a close enough in practice). With these parameters, we can get the risk-neutral probability, p=[(1+Rf)-D]/(U-D)=0.555. We then create a binomial tree with two different values generated on an annual basis. Each node in the tree has a subsequent upward or downward possibility. The asset value movements as follows:
Here the value for each subsequent year equals the earlier year value multiplied by u or d. An inflation adjustment can be made to this by using u(1+infl).
5 Luehrman (1998a) details how these assumptions can cause a +/-10% variation in option valuations. He argued that in the uncertain world of investments, a near enough valuation is the best possible result. 
Put option based on phase 1 property investment guarantee (reversibility option)
We use the present value of all the phase 1 capital investment as the starting (end of year 1996) property value. In Force's situation the time to expiry is 6 years, with settlement date and expiry of Option 1 scheduled for 2002. The exercise price is the value at which it becomes economic to exercise the option to sell. In this case we assume Force will use the option and sell to Village
Roadshow if the market value of the 25 % share falls below the exercise price US$14.22m.
We work out the value of two options, Option 1: The Reversibility Option and Option 2:
Investment in Phase 2, using the binomial approach. The Black Scholes valuation is in the appendix. The same market parameters used in the above call options are applied in the put option calculation. The five year binary movements are as follows: The final analysis provides strong justification for Force to make an investment in Phase 1, even if it cannot arrange an exit option with Village (Option 1). The value created by the flexibility of investment (as opposed to compulsory investment) changes the negative DCF result substantially.
This supports the strategic advantages of the project that managers would have otherwise considered intuitively. Conversely, if Force were to commit to both Phase 1 and 2 now, it is likely that the risks would not justify the return. This is the reason why we have a negative NPV.
True Value of Investment Opportunity (US$m)
Phase One DCF $ -1.12
Call Option on Phase 2 $ 2.14 Put Option on Guaranteed Price $ 1.30
Total PV of Phase 1 $ 2.32
The justification for investment in VSA is largely based on the present value of the option to invest further in Phase 2. The present value of Phase 2 incorporates not just the underlying cashflows, but reflects the flexibility offered by this future investment opportunity. The Argentine economic climate was highly uncertain, and the greater the uncertainty the greater the value created by retaining options as opposed to making a direct investment. In practice, using a DCF methodology assumes volatility is only negative, so that the high possible project volatility meant an increase in the discount rate, so that NPV was strongly decreased, especially the terminal value.
Using a real options approach recognizes that high volatility increase the chance of strongly positive outcomes, as well as strongly negative. If the project can be phased so that subsequent phases can be postponed or exited then high volatility can be positive.
Note however, there are problems in practice associated with storing large value in options, because it is difficult to stop competitors from getting in first and destroying their value. This problem is worst when there are only a few competitors in the market and high barriers. VSA and other competitors are an oligopolistic industry, and speed of construction was important. 6 Analysis of Results and Development of Strategy Luehrman (1998a) developed a framework to assist managers make decisions using real option analysis. He emphasized the importance of not just looking at the NPV of the investment but also the forecast variance. By considering volatility we can extend the NPV 'invest now/ do not invest' criteria into a three-dimensional framework. The framework can help managers to review the strategic effect of an increase or decrease in the volatility of the investment opportunity.
Luehrmann's (1998a) graph shows 6 different investment opportunities. The value to cost axis is simply the NPV(q); and the volatility axis is simply σ/ t .
Source: Luehrman (1998a) Page 97.
Position F is analogous to Force's investment in VSA. Despite having a positive NPV(q), the high volatility would normally mean that the best strategy is to wait and retain the option to invest at a later date. The 'option space' framework modifies the NPV rule, because option F is likely to offer an even greater risk-adjusted value if exercised in the future. The reason for this is that options are worth more than direct investments when uncertainty increases. However, Force could not afford to wait, as competitors were threatening to take away the opportunity altogether. Strategies implemented to protect the value of this option 7 were not likely to work.
While, in Force's situation, the real option analysis is restricted by assumptions, the real options framework provides a much better strategic insight into FDI decisions than the NPV. Real option assumptions can be relaxed further and extra accuracy can be gained by adding extra features 8 to our valuation model. Real options provide a useful framework in justifying strategic projects that are intuitively appealing to management, but have persistently negative NPVs. This situation occurs frequently when discretionary future investment opportunities are subject to high volatility.
These opportunities often require no capital commitment immediately, but are heavily discounted by the NPV regardless. In this instance, reliance on a NPV would mean that investment in VSA might not have gone ahead. Using real options means these opportunities are properly analyzed and inaccurate adjustments are no longer required.
Factors such as uncertainty and flexibility are important characteristics that should be considered integral parts to a comprehensive decision-making process. The analysis provides managers with a superior strategic insight, as well as providing a more accurate valuation of the investment opportunity.
Funding Issues and Project Outcome

Funding Issues
At this stage the results show that the Phase 1 VSA investment is viable despite having a negative NPV. However, while phase 1 was financed by Force with equity, VSA planned to finance portions of Phase 2 with US$ debt. This meant that most of the benefits derived from investing in Phases 1 and 2 occur because of the high present value of debt. This signifies that VSA created most of its value, not from the core business of cinema operation, but from using debt to finance business in a risky country. The high leverage was created by the use of debt under the proposed medium term notes agreement. The analysis so far doesn't account for this.
For VSA, financing with foreign US$ debt magnified Argentine country risks. This is undesirable, and management would need to carefully consider whether too much leverage was being used in Phase 2 under the proposed medium term notes arrangement. While financing in local currency may on the surface be more expensive, it provides an important means of reducing currency exposure and political risk, as the value of debt would correlate with the value of assets.
The additional exposure to currency and country risk associated with this foreign debt changed the nature and risk levels of the investment quite significantly, as the increase in risk would result in a much higher discount rate for Phase 2, which would bring the viability of the project into question. It is likely that thorough financial analysis would have provided Force with a substantial increase in discount rate and given the Phase 2 developments a substantially negative present value. Heavy borrowings might increase the APV, but will also increase project risks. The added risks of high levels of debt financing are not incorporated into the project's discount rate. On the surface this would make the VSA project appear far more attractive than what it really is.
If Force had stuck to the strategy of financing developments with equity, VSA would have been a much more attractive proposition, and they would probably have survived the crisis. Despite the 1999 economic crisis, VSA's earnings remained relatively robust, because its cinemas were still fundamentally profitable. The financing decision was made after committing funds to investing in part of Phase 2. The problem for Force was that VSA had already invested in long-term property assets, and was forced to quickly find a means of funding this. Force had a relatively small asset base compared to the investment, and had already committed most of its liquid capital to the Argentinean expansion. Force had already raised new equity capital for Argentina, and a further additional equity issue would be difficult to justify to shareholders.
The use of foreign currency debt however led to short-term financing issues that caused financial distress to Force, despite VSA maintaining a positive EBIT. A major issue is that Force relied on the financial assessments by Village Roadshow, and did not do enough of its own capital budgeting analysis prior to making these decisions. For instance it is likely that Village Roadshow (a ~ 19 ~ diversified MNC) would have a substantially different cost of capital to Force, so that for the same project the partners would different appraisal results.
In 1998 country risk in Argentina increased immensely with the government bond credit spread rising to above 14% 9 . By June 1998, the Argentine government bond rate increased to above 20% per annum. It is unlikely that investment in Phase 2 could be justified given the rise in country risk alone.
Currency Issues
Foreign exchange risk is conventionally regarded as a symmetrical and thus neutral risk. Keck et al. (1998) and Lessard (1996) , for example, recommend against discounting for foreign exchange risk because the risk is diversifiable. Profit can go up just as easily as downwards, and hedges can be used to minimize variance. However, over time foreign exchange risk is not always balanced.
In Force's situation the Argentine Peso was fixed to US dollar by a peg, and the risk was thus asymmetrical in favor of an Argentine devaluation. In addition, Force's Peso/ US$ currency risk was largely realized from the financing structure.
Hedging is another important consideration. Village's assessment argued that that Force's main foreign exchange risk was the NZ$/ US$ risk, as currency forecasts showed that Argentina's peg looked set to hold in the medium term. Force thus purchased $60 million dollars worth of NZD/ USD forwards, while the US$/AGP risk went unhedged. The US$ financing structure left Force overexposed to high levels of long-term risk.
By giving the bank a parent guarantee, Force was writing in effect writing a put option of its own warranting that Argentina's currency peg would hold. The US$ financing meant that if economic conditions deteriorated rapidly (as they had done and often do in volatile countries) the bank could then exercise the option to seek repayment, even if the project was profitable in Peso In such volatile environments, guarantees (as highlighted by large value of Option 1) are worth considerable amounts of money. It is likely that the true cost of debt including the guarantee and the effects of the incremental foreign exchange risk was substantially higher than the risk-adjusted returns offered by the investment.
9 See Appendix.
Property Issues
In investment terms, property development is a substantially different activity to property ownership. Property development is by definition a short-term, higher risk activity; whereas property ownership is generally typified by long-term low risk investing. The lack of a secondary market for VSA's property developments meant that VSA by default became a long-term commercial property owner. Property investment becomes less attractive in climates with low inflation because property acts as a shield against inflation. The sensitivity analysis in VSA's NPV highlighted Force's reliance on investment capital gains. A sale and leaseback program would have substantially increased VSA's risk adjusted returns. By having a big capital commitment in property assets, Force was exposed to high levels of asymmetrical non-linear currency and country risk.
Reversibility
Lastly, our real options analysis highlighted the value of reversibility. At the time, Force underestimated the illiquidity of its investment in VSA. In terms of resources, Force had made a big commitment to Argentina and would probably only want to liquidate this in the event of an extreme downturn. Other prospective purchasers (including joint venture partner Village) would have exactly the same reasons of not wanting to buy Force's share without a substantial discount.
The medium term notes agreement (and more importantly the guarantee) rendered Force's share virtually illiquid under these circumstances. The financing agreement exacerbated Force's liquidity problems in addition to creating additional currency risks and foreign exchange risks.
Many FDIs are illiquid, and smaller companies like Force need to consider liquidity a lot more carefully than larger, more diversified, companies due to their exposure to debt issues and currency variability, and will be more exposed than larger MNCs to downturns in individual markets. Lack of liquidity is another reason why Force should have produced its own investment analysis. 
Sensitivity Analysis
Conclusion
It is important that investments are made in areas that are the most likely to add value to a business. Taking intelligent risks is at the heart of running a successful business. In the context of FDI conventional DCF appraisal techniques are often invalid, as they do not cope with the additional risks involved. Yet, given the often poor outcomes of FDI, accurate, flexible, appraisal is vital.
The use of real option methods adds substantial information to the appraisal process and should be encouraged. Phasing investment as a series of steps, with re-evaluation at each step is also essential. FDI appraisals should be designed to highlight key areas such as flexibility and sensitivity to risk. This case-study highlights the importance of adding liquidity to FDI's. 
VSA Project Outcome
The 1999 
_________________________________________________________________ Appendix
Limitations
This research is subject to the following limitations:
Conclusions were drawn on the basis of 1999 appraisal report data. This data is not likely to provide an accurate depiction of the circumstances Force faced in 1997.
The real options approach and other aspects contained in this report were not widely available at the time of Force's investment, and therefore are not meant as a criticism of decisions made. No criticism is implied on part of any member of the Force management.
The analysis is subject to assumptions. Best efforts have been made to keep the analysis as realistic and accurate as possible, but this may not always be the case.
Inferences drawn from analysis in the report are designed to illustrate how practitioners can use financial information to reach conclusions on the viability of investment. This is subject to limitations, hence any conclusion or finding is subject to error.
The options presented in the real option analysis are hypothetical, and are merely designed to highlight the potential value of real option analysis. It is unlikely that Option 1 would have been available to Force.
The report does not provide financial analysis evaluating the medium term notes agreement. This is considered outside the scope of this research report. An absolute opinion about the suitability of the financing agreement cannot be drawn without further financial analysis.
The framework uses the best methods available given the practicalities of the situation. It is acknowledged that additional accuracy can be generated (especially in the real option analysis), but such detail was considered outside the scope of this report.
Country Risk Evolution of Argentina and Latin America (EMBI)
Source: www.dfat.gov.au/geo/argentina/argentina_country_brief.html ~ 24 ~
Black-Scholes Approach
Call option based on phase 2 investment (expansion option)
We use Black-Scholes formula to calculate the call option value;
where;  N(d 1 ), N(d 2 ) = cumulative normal probability  s = annualized standard deviation (volatility) of the continuously compounded return on the stock (the only unknown)  r c = continuously compounded risk-free rate We use two valuation methods: 1) Use Phase 2 PV (1996) of expected future incomes as current asset price and expected future (1998 value) investment as Exercise Price (although the trial project is phase 1, the real value effect is measured on the Phase 2 cash flows, assuming the phase 2 value moves in the same direction as phase 1 value.); and 2) Use phase 2 NPV (1996 value) as asset value and 10% of the NPV as Exercise Price.
The necessary inputs are shown in table 4, for the two methods. The first method assumes that the future investment value is fixed and the second method assumes that the project will be abandoned if its NPV has a decline of 90% of the current value -a subject abandon threshold of 10% NPV. The call option values are 2.14 and 2.30 respectively to the two methods. These two call option values provide the likely range of possible option value.
The binomial lattice values the option using an open form probability tree. U and D are upward and downward adjustments that occur at the end of each year based on investment volatility.
There is a 50% chance that the asset value rises during the year (and is multiplied by U), and a 50% chance that the asset falls at by an inverse amount (and is multiplied by D). If we use 1% NPV as the new threshold, the call option will be 1.29.
Put option based on phase 1 property investment guarantee (reversibility option)
We can also use the Black-Scholes formula to calculate the put option: 
